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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jason Ward contends the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his claim that
he should receive a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence. The district court completely
failed to consider one of the affidavits he filed in support of his claim, and its decisions in regard
to the other affidavits he filed are directly contrary to the applicable law. As such, this Court
should reverse the district court’s erroneous order.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
During his jury trial, Mr. Ward testified that he had sexual intercourse with M.M., but
that it was consensual. 1 (R., p.176 (quoting State v. Ward (Ward I), 2014 WL 3555769, *2
(Ct. App. 2014).) M.M., on the other hand, testified that the intercourse was not consensual.
(R., p.175 (quoting Ward I, 2014 WL 3555769, *1).) The jury apparently believed M.M., as
they found Mr. Ward guilty of rape. (See R., p.176 (quoting Ward I, 2014 WL 3555769, *2).)
Mr. Ward timely appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Ward I, 2014 WL
3555769, *8.
Mr. Ward subsequently filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, arguing, inter
alia, that his attorney had been ineffective for not conducting a sufficient investigation of

1

This case was reassigned from Judge Bevan to Judge Copsey partway through the proceedings.
While Judge Copsey stated she had ““actually read everything, everything that exists,” (Tr., p.3,
Ls.13-14), the record is unclear whether she was referring to, and ultimately relying on, the
transcripts and records from the underlying cases, or just on the opinions issued in the prior
appeals in this matter. (See generally R., pp.173-86 (the district court’s order of summary
dismissal).) If she was relying on the transcripts and records from the underlying cases, the
district court may have implicitly taken judicial notice of the documents. As such, a motion
requesting this Court to resolve the question of whether those transcripts and clerk’s records
should be made part of the record in this appeal has been filed contemporaneously with this
brief.
1

potential witnesses. Ward v. State (Ward II), 2017 WL 1046674, *1 (Ct. App. 2017). One of
the witnesses he claimed his attorney should have investigated was Lane Buddenhagen, who,
Mr. Ward had told trial counsel, could have testified that M.M. had made similar, but unfounded,
claims of rape against Mr. Buddenhagen. (R., pp.176-77 (quoting Ward v. State (Ward II), 2017
WL 1046674, *2 (Ct. App. 2017).) The district court summarily dismissed that petition and
Mr. Ward timely appealed that decision. Ward II, 2017 WL 1046674, *1.
During that appeal, Mr. Ward was initially appointed counsel, but that attorney ultimately
withdrew from the case. Id. The Court of Appeals subsequently refused to consider Mr. Ward’s
pro se argument that he should get a new trial based on new evidence because that was not part
of the claim his post-conviction attorney had argued in the district court and held that he had
abandoned the argument his attorney had raised. Id. at **2-3. The Court of Appeals also held
that, to the extent Mr. Ward was trying to argue his post-conviction attorney was ineffective for
not raising the new-trial claim, that was not a viable argument. Id. (citing Murphy v. State, 156
Idaho 389, 394 (2014)). As such, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Mr. Ward’s initial
petition. Id. at *4.
While his post-conviction appeal was pending, Mr. Ward filed the current petition, in
which, inter alia, he raised the claim for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
(R., p.16.) Post-conviction counsel argued this motion should be considered timely under the
doctrine of equitable tolling. (R., pp.82-84.) The prosecutor did not make any response to that
point, nor did he make any other argument that Mr. Ward’s claims were untimely.

(See

generally R., pp.96-99 (the State’s answer); R., pp.112-25 (the State’s motion for summary
dismissal and brief in support).) The district court did not make any findings in regard to
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timeliness; it only addressed Mr. Ward’s claim for a new trial on its merits. (R., pp.179-86;
see generally R., pp.173-86.)
In support of his claim for a new trial on new evidence, Mr. Ward provided the affidavits
of four witnesses, and he asserted he did not know about the evidence in this regard at the time of
trial (R., pp.21, 85):
1) Lane Buddenhagen, who would testify he was an acquaintance of M.M.’s and that, on
June 1, 2011, “[M.M.] told me she had filed a false police report in order to obtain
consideration from law enforcement and her probation officer due to fear of
incarceration. She also stated that nothing had ever happened between her and Jasson
[sic] Ward.” (R., p.23.) Mr. Buddenhagen would also testify that, during a second
conversation, M.M. told him that “she had several conversations with the prosecution
and that they were forcing her to testify and telling her to fabricate and manufacture
information. She went on to state that they, the prosecution, were also threatening her
on numerous occasions about her being violated on probation if she did not
cooperate.” (R., p.23.) Mr. Ward did not learn that Mr. Buddenhagen could testify to
these facts until a conversation with Mr. Buddenhagen several years after the fact,
while they were both in prison. (R., p.83.)
2) Jennifer Wicklund, who would testify that, as the person who was supposed to
conduct random drug tests on M.M. as part of M.M.’s probation, she was aware that
M.M. had missed numerous scheduled drug tests in May 2011. (R., pp.79-80.)
3) Delmar Jack, who would testify that he was an acquaintance of M.M.’s and that they
had gotten high on methamphetamine together on May 20, 2011. (R., p.101.) He
would also testify that he heard about the charges in this case and was able to talk
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with her about a month later and ask if she was doing alright. (R., p.102.) He would
testify that she responded that “she claimed rape so she would not go to prison or get
violated. She had said that the prosecution lady told her she had to take it to trial but
she did not want to. She told me she was scared and feeling forced by the prosecution
to say this so she would not be violated and/or go to prison.” (R., p.102.) Finally, he
said he only met Mr. Ward while the two of them were in prison together.
(R., p.102.)
4) Lindsay Petersen, who would testify that he was an acquaintance of M.M.’s and that,
during a conversation with her in August 2011, she told him “without prompting” that
the “state was forcing her to testify that he [Jason Ward] raped her” even though “she
further explained that ‘he did not rape [her].’” (R., p.169 (brackets from original).)
Mr. Petersen would also testify that M.M. explained she was “afraid of what the state
would do to her if she did not testify as they wanted her to do.” (R., p.169.)
At the State’s motion, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Ward’s petition.
(R., pp.112-25, 173-86.) The district court concluded that the affidavits of Mr. Buddenhagen and
Mr. Jack contained only inadmissible hearsay evidence, as it concluded, without explanation,
that M.M.’s statements contained therein were not admissible under the then-existing mental
state hearsay exception contained in I.R.E. 803(3).

(R., p.181.)

It also concluded the

information provided in Ms. Wicklund’s affidavit was not relevant to anything in this case.
(R., p.182.) However, the district court did not mention Mr. Petersen’s affidavit at all. (See
generally R., pp.173-86.)
The district court also concluded that, even if there were admissible evidence in those
affidavits, they were still insufficient to justify a new trial. Specifically, it held that “statements
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that contradict statements made at trial are not substantive evidence” and so, “evidence as to
[M.M.’s] veracity could only be used, if at all, for impeachment purposes.” (R., p.184.) It also
held that, because Mr. Ward had told defense counsel that Mr. Buddenhagen was a potential
witness, they could have discovered Mr. Buddenhagen’s testimony about M.M.’s admissions
through an exercise of due diligence. (R., p.185.) However, it specifically contrasted the
situation surrounding Mr. Buddenhagen with the situation around Mr. Jack, who the district court
recognized was a new witness. (Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.15, L.5.) Finally, it held that held that the
new evidence probably would not produce an acquittal because the district court considered the
other evidence presented to be strong, and that, because Mr. Ward had taken the stand, his
statements admitting the charge while entering a guilty plea were admissible. (R., pp.185-86.)
The district court did not mention the fact that the plea in question had been withdrawn because
it was not a knowing, intelligent, or voluntary plea due to the fact that Mr. Ward received
erroneous advice from his prior attorney. See Ward I, 2014 WL 3555769, *1.
Mr. Ward filed a notice of appeal timely from the final judgment dismissing his claims in
this case. (R., pp.171, 190.)

5

ISSUE
Whether the district court’s decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Ward’s claim for a new trial
based on new evidence is inconsistent with the applicable legal standards in a multitude of
respects.

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court’s Decision To Summarily Dismiss Mr. Ward’s Claim For A New Trial Based
On New Evidence Is Inconsistent With The Applicable Legal Standards In A Multitude Of
Respects
A.

Standard Of Review
When the appellate court reviews a decision to summarily dismiss claims raised in a

petition for post-conviction relief, the appropriate question is “‘whether the appellant has alleged
facts in his petition that, if true, would entitle him to relief,’” as that would show a genuine issue
material fact. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2007) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 140
Idaho 789, 792 (2004)). In conducting that evaluation, “[a] court is required to accept all the
petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but it need not accept the petitioner’s conclusions.”
Id. As such, “[a] court may not weigh evidence or make determinations of credibility on a
motion for summary dismissal.” Jones v. State, 125 Idaho 294, 301 (Ct. App. 1994). Rather, it
must construe the facts and the reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor unless the
alleged facts are clearly disproved by the record. Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 839 (2007);
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523 (2007). Mr. Ward is the non-moving party in this case.
In regard to a claim for a new trial based on new evidence, the determination of whether
the new evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, but the ultimate decision of whether to grant or
deny the claim for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Capone, ___ P.3d
___, 2018 WL 4265726, *2 (2018). A district court abuses its discretion if it: (1) fails to
appreciate the issue as one within its discretion; (2) acts beyond the outer bounds of its
discretion; (3) acts inconsistently with the applicable legal standards; or (4) fails to exercise
reason in reaching its decision. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
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To succeed on a claim for a new trial based on new evidence, the petitioner needs to
show that: “(1) that the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the
time of trial; (2) that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) that it
will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that failure to learn of the evidence was due to no
lack of diligence on the part of the defendant.” State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691 (1976).

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Consider Mr. Ward’s Claim
Based On Mr. Petersen’s Affidavit At All
The district court specifically addressed Mr. Ward’s assertions that he should receive a

new trial based on the new evidence in Mr. Jack’s, Mr. Buddenhagen’s, and Ms. Wicklund’s
affidavits under the applicable standards. (See generally R., pp.173-86.) However, it made no
mention at all in regard to Mr. Ward’s assertion that he should receive a new trial based on the
new evidence provided in Mr. Petersen’s affidavit, and so, it failed to evaluate whether the new
evidence in Mr. Petersen’s affidavit was admissible and justified a new trial. (See generally
R., pp.173-86.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held that, by summarily dismissing a claim
without addressing all the issues raised therein, the district court acts contrary to the applicable
legal standards, and so, abuses its discretion. Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho
375, 380 (2010) (explaining that even considering the district court’s silence as a tacit ruling on
the issue, “the district court’s unsupported denial is still an abuse of discretion” because it
“leaves this Court without an adequate basis upon which to understand the premise behind the
district court’s determination”); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009) (“For
nearly two decades, the appellate courts of this State have consistently held that the trial courts
must determine the admissibility of evidence as a ‘threshold question’ to be answered before
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addressing the merits of motions for summary judgment.”). Because the record shows the
district court failed to consider all the issues raised in Mr. Ward’s claim for a new trial, this
Court should vacate the order summarily dismissing that claim on that basis alone.

C.

The Affidavits Mr. Ward Presented In Support Of His Claim For A New Trial Contained
Admissible Evidence
As Montgomery indicates, the district court must determine whether the evidence

presented is admissible before it can resolve a motion for summary disposition. Montgomery,
147 Idaho at 6-7 (defining admissibility as a “threshold question”). The Idaho Rules of Evidence
provide that hearsay statements which describe “the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such
as motive, intent, or plan) . . . but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed” are admissible. I.R.E. 803(3). However, the district court stated,
without explanation, that M.M.’s statements which were recounted in the affidavits of Mr. Jack
and Mr. Buddenhagen did not fall under that exception. (R., p.181.) The fact that the district
court gave no reasoning for its decision in that regard, in and of itself, shows the abuse of the
district court’s discretion in this case. See Dawson, 149 Idaho at 380.
More importantly, however, the district court’s conclusion – that the statements were not
admissible – is actually directly contrary to the applicable legal standards. The Court of Appeals
has made it clear that, under I.R.E. 803(3), “[a] victim’s out-of-court expression of fear may be
used to show his or her state of mind but not to prove the underlying facts upon which the fear is
based.” State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 128 (Ct. App. 1986). That is because such a
statement describes the state of the victim’s mind at the moment that statement is made. E.g., In
Interest of S.W., 127 Idaho 513, 519 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a child’s letter to the judge
was admissible under I.R.E. 803(3) because “[t]he letter in this case was to show S.T.’s state of
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mind, i.e., her fears regarding returning to Quaring and her current concerns”); cf. State v.
Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 437 (2015) (explaining that the hypothetical statement, “I hate X”
would be admissible under I.R.E. 803(3) because it would goes to prove the declarant’s feelings
toward X at that time).
Additionally, statements of an intent or plan to do a thing have always been admissible
under this rationale as evidence to show that the declarant subsequently carried out that intent or
plan. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295-96 (1892). In Hillmon, the
Supreme Court held that the declarant’s letter stating his intent to go to Crooked Creek was
admissible to prove that he had, in fact, subsequently gone to Crooked Creek. Id. That evidence
was relevant to disprove the plaintiff’s contention that the unidentified body found at Crooked
Creek was Hillmon’s (as opposed to the declarant’s), and thereby show the claim for Hillmon’s
life insurance policy was fraudulent. Id.
The rule from Hillmon was subsequently embodied in F.R.E. 803(3). 1974 Note to
F.R.E. 803(3) (clarifying that this rule only makes the evidence admissible to show the
declarant’s own future conduct, not the future conduct of some other person). When Idaho
enacted its rules of evidence, it adopted the federal rules of evidence to ensure, to the extent
practicable, uniformity in trial practice. State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757, 760 (Ct. App. 1995).
As such, when Idaho’s rules mirror the federal rules, like I.R.E. 803(3) does, Idaho will look to
how the federal rules are understood for guidance on interpreting Idaho’s rules. Hoffer v.
Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 874 (2016); cf. Quayle v. Mackert, 92 Idaho 563, 568 (1968) (noting
the same limitation that is in the 1974 note to the federal rule and citing, inter alia, Hillmon).
In this case, then, M.M.’s statements in the affidavits of Mr. Jack and Mr. Buddenhagen
(and, though not considered by the district court, in the affidavit of Mr. Petersen as well) were
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admissible because they contained statements in which M.M. explained why she was feeling
afraid at that moment in time. Those statements were not offered to prove the underlying fact
asserted – that the prosecution was actually threatening her. Rather, they were offered to prove
that M.M. was afraid and that her fear motivated her to formulate a plan to make false claims
against Mr. Ward, and, like in Hillmon, thereby show that she subsequently carried out that plan.
As such, they all those statements were of M.M.’s then-existing state of mind – of her motive,
intent, and plan – and therefore, were all admissible under I.R.E. 803(3).
Moreover, Mr. Jack’s and Ms. Wicklund’s affidavits actually contained non-hearsay
evidence, which of course is admissible in its own right, since it was relevant to prove some of
the facts underlying M.M.’s fear. See Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho at 128 (indicating that such
corroborating evidence should be admitted). Mr. Jack asserted that he and M.M. gotten high on
methamphetamine around the time of the incident with Mr. Ward. (See R., p.101.) To that same
point, Ms. Wicklund asserted that she knew M.M. had missed numerous required drug tests
during that same time frame. (R., pp.79-80.) Those two facts would tend to show that M.M.’s
fear of a probation violation was legitimate since both facts (likely) constituted violations of the
terms of her probation.

Moreover, the fact that Ms. Wicklund’s affidavit corroborates the

evidence proffered in the other affidavits reveals that the district court’s conclusion – that
Ms. Wicklund’s affidavit contained no relevant information (R., p.182) – is simply wrong and
demonstrates that the district court failed to appreciate the nature of the claim before it.
For all those reasons, the district court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing
Mr. Ward’s claim for a new trial based on its erroneous and unexplained conclusion that he did
not present any admissible evidence. Thus, the only question remaining is whether that new
evidence was sufficient to justify a new trial under the standard set forth in Drapeau.
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D.

The District Court’s Decision To Summarily Dismiss Mr. Ward’s Claim For A New Trial
Is Inconsistent With A Proper Understanding Of The Legal Standards Established Under
Drapeau

1.

The evidence Mr. Ward presented was newly-discovered, as it was not known to
him or his trial attorney at the time of trial

Mr. Ward averred that he did not know about any of this evidence at the time of trial.
(R., pp.21, 83, 85.) Mr. Jack corroborated that, asserting he only met Mr. Ward while they were
in prison together (i.e., after Mr. Ward’s trial).

(R., p.102.)

In fact, the district court

acknowledged that Mr. Jack was a new witness who was not known to Mr. Ward at the time of
trial. (R., p.6, Ls.17-19; p.14, L.23 - p.15, L.5.) There is no indication in the record that
Mr. Ward knew about Ms. Wicklund or Mr. Petersen at the time of trial either. Rather, the fact
that Mr. Petersen’s affidavit was provided right before the scheduled hearing suggests that
Mr. Ward did not actually learn about him until late in the post-conviction process. Finally, the
district court’s conclusion that the information in Mr. Buddenhagen’s affidavit could have been
discovered through due diligence under the fourth prong of the Drapeau test affirmatively
indicates that this particular information was not actually known to Mr. Ward at the time of trial.
(See R., p.185.) Therefore, all the evidence Mr. Ward presented satisfies the first prong of
Drapeau.

2.

The evidence Mr. Ward presented was material, and so, was not merely
cumulative or impeaching

The district court’s conclusion under the second prong of Drapeau – that “statements that
contradict statements made at trial are not substantive evidence” and so, “evidence as to
[M.M.’s] veracity could only be used, if at all, for impeachment purposes (R., p.184 (emphasis
added)) – flatly ignores the well-recognized principle that evidence can be both substantive and
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impeaching. E.g., State v. Ellington (Ellington I), 151 Idaho 53, 74 (2011) (quoting State v.
Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69 (Ct. App. 2004)). Evidence that is both material and impeaching
is not merely impeaching and Drapeau only bars evidence that is “merely cumulative or
impeaching.” Drapeau, 97 Idaho 691 (emphasis added). As a result, the simple fact that
evidence has impeaching qualities does not mean, as the district court concluded, that it cannot
still satisfy the Drapeau standard.
In fact, the evidence Mr. Ward presented in this case was material. Evidence has material
or substantive value when it has “‘some logical connection with the consequential facts.’” Id. at
74 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (9th ed. 2009)). In other words, evidence is
material if it would “provide evidence for or against any proposition advanced by either party.”
State v. Ellington (Ellington II), 157 Idaho 480, 486 (2014) (emphasis added). As a result, the
Court of Appeals has actually held that evidence similar to that which Mr. Ward offered in this
case satisfied the second prong of Drapeau because it provided evidence which went against the
central proposition of the State’s case:
In the case at hand, McKinney’s affidavit proclaims that Small had no knowledge
of and took no part in Bishop’s murder. This evidence is substantive because it
has been offered to persuade the trier of fact that Small is innocent. It is not
simply an attack on the credibility of the witness who testified that Small and
McKinney conspired to kill Bishop . . . . Therefore, McKinney’s proposed
testimony is not merely impeaching.
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 335 (Ct. App. 1998). In Mr. Ward’s case, as in Small, the
evidence in the affidavits was offered to persuade the trier of fact that Mr. Ward was innocent of
the charge of rape, and so, it is not merely impeaching.
The proper understanding of the second prong of Drapeau actually reveals that the case
on which the district court relied does not support the district court’s conclusion. (See R., p.184
(citing State v. Palin, 106 Idaho 70 (Ct. App. 1983)).) The reason the affidavit in Palin was not
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substantive evidence was that the defendant in that case had been charged with statutory rape,
which meant the only consequential facts in that case were whether there was intercourse and
whether the victim was under the age of eighteen. Palin, 106 Idaho at 77. Since the proffered
affidavit only addressed the question of consent, it was not relevant to a consequential fact. Id.
By comparison, Mr. Ward was charged with committing rape by forcing sexual
intercourse against M.M.’s will. See Ward I, 2014 WL 3555769, **1-2 (recounting the charge
and the trial testimony in the underlying criminal case). Therefore, the evidence in his proffered
affidavits – that M.M. said the intercourse in this case was not rape (thereby implying that it was
consensual) – was material to a central issue in this case – whether the intercourse was against
her will. Since the evidence Mr. Ward presented was material to the central issue in this case,
the fact that it also tends to impeach M.M.’s trial testimony does not mean this evidence fails
under the second prong of Drapeau.
That same analysis shows the information in those affidavits was not merely cumulative.
In fact, they were not cumulative at all. For example, Ms. Wicklund’s affidavit was the only one
which spoke to M.M. missing the drug tests. Additionally, Mr. Jack’s, Mr. Buddenhagen’s, and
Mr. Petersen’s affidavits each recounted a separate incident where, under separate circumstances,
M.M. made similar, though distinct, statements to each separate affiant. (See R., pp.23, 102,
169.) Thus, Mr. Jack’s evidence, for example, does not “‘go[] to prove what has already been
established by’” Mr. Petersen’s affidavit, or vice versa. Small, 132 Idaho at 335 (quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 380 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the term “cumulative evidence”). Thus,
the district court decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Ward’s claim for a new trial under the
second prong of the Drapeau test was directly contrary to the applicable legal standards,
meaning it was an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
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3.

The evidence Mr. Ward presented probably would have produced an acquittal

The third prong of Drapeau requires the petitioner show the new evidence would
“probably produce an acquittal.” Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691. As Drapeau itself explained, Idaho
has long understood that this means a petitioner has to show the evidence “‘is such as to render a
different verdict reasonably probable upon retrial, and that the evidence could not with
reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial.’” Id. at 692 (quoting
State v. Fleming, 17 Idaho 471, 505 (1910), overruled on other grounds) (emphasis added);
accord State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 152-53 (Ct. App. 1986) (comparing this standard to
the one in the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that evidence which was very similar to the
evidence Mr. Ward presented satisfied the third prong of Drapeau. Ellington I, 151 Idaho at
75-76.
In Ellington I, the new evidence revealed that one of the State’s witnesses had likely
offered perjured testimony during the trial. Id. The Supreme Court explained that evidence
satisfied the third prong of Drapeau because “[i]t simply cannot be said that it was not probable
that this new evidence – that showed [the witness] testified falsely, and likely intentionally, in
the Ellington trial – would have affected the jury’s determination of reasonable doubt, because it
went straight to the heart of the defense’s main theory of the case.” Id. (dashes added); accord
State v. Caldwell, 112 Idaho 748, 753 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that evidence which corroborated
the defendant’s testimony satisfied the third prong of Drapeau); State v. Ames, 112 Idaho 144,
149 (Ct. App. 1986) (remanding the case for an actual determination on the third prong
specifically because the district court “could have determined the new evidence [which
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corroborated the defendant’s testimony] was likely to raise a reasonable doubt,” and thus, the
probability of an acquittal) (emphasis from original).
Here, too, the new evidence showed that a witness testified falsely, and likely
intentionally done so because she felt pressured to do so or else face an allegation of probation
violation. (R., pp.23, 102, 169.) Thus, just as in Ellington I, Caldwell, and Ames, there was a
probability that the new evidence would affect the jury’s determination of reasonable doubt on
retrial, especially since that new evidence went straight to the heart of this case. Therefore, the
new evidence in this case would also probably produce an acquittal.
That there is such a probability in Mr. Ward’s case is further revealed by the fact that the
new evidence of M.M.’s statements were accompanied by corroborating circumstances which
made those recounted statements more trustworthy. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
300-01 (1973) (identifying several circumstances which indicate such statements are more
trustworthy). First, when the statement is made spontaneously, it is more trustworthy. Id. at 300.
To that point, Mr. Petersen specifically noted that the statement M.M. made to him was made
“without prompting.” (R., p.169.) That means her spontaneous statement to Mr. Petersen was
more likely to be believed by a reasonable juror, and so, create a reasonable doubt, and thus, the
probability of an acquittal.2
Second, when there are multiple independent confessions of this nature, each individual
confession corroborates the others. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300; accord State v. Meister, 148
Idaho 236, 242 (2009). In fact, jurors are actually more likely to be convinced when multiple
witnesses offer this sort of inherently-corroborating testimony. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Tests

2

This point in particular reveals why the district court’s failure to consider Mr. Petersen’s
affidavit at all is a reversible abuse of the district court’s discretion. (See Section B, supra.)
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for Harm in Criminal Cases: A Fix for Blurred Lines, 17 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 991, 1059 (2015)
(explaining that “[b]ecause of their experience and training, judges may dismiss evidence as
cumulative, concluding it had or would have had limited impact, whereas jurors actually attach
significant weight to redundant evidence.”) (citing Jason M. Solomon, Causing Constitutional
Harm: How Tort Law Can Help Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials, 99 NW. U. L.
Rev. 1053, 1091-92 (2005), and Reid Hastie, et al., Inside the Jury, 163-64 (1983)). Here,
M.M. made at least four independent confessions to three different individuals over a period of
three months. (R., pp.23, 102, 169.) That means each of those statements makes the others more
trustworthy, and therefore, more likely to be believed by a reasonable juror. As such, they create
a reasonable doubt, and thus, the probability of an acquittal.
Third, statements which are against the declarant’s penal interest indicate the
trustworthiness of the statements accompanying the admission. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01.
In this case, not only were M.M.’s recounted statements against her penal interest, as they
admitted that she intended to offer untruthful testimony at trial, Mr. Jack’s affidavit, itself, was
against his own penal interests as he admitted to felony possession of methamphetamine therein.
(R., p.101.) As a result, not only were M.M.’s recounted statements more likely to be believed
by a reasonable juror, Mr. Jack’s evidence itself was more likely to be believed by a reasonable
juror. Either fact alone created a reasonable doubt, and thus, the probability of an acquittal.
Certainly, the two together did.
Finally, as discussed in Section C, supra, there was non-hearsay evidence from Mr. Jack
and Ms. Wicklund which also corroborated the recounted statements. (R., pp.102, 169.) That
M.M.’s statements were corroborated by factual evidence further indicates that a reasonable juror
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was more likely to believe her statements, and so, the new evidence created a reasonable doubt,
and thus, the probability of an acquittal.
The conclusion that the new evidence would create the probability of an acquittal,
remains true despite the district court’s conclusion that the other evidence presented at trial was
strong in the State’s favor.3 As the Idaho Supreme Court has revealed, the question of whether
evidence which the jury did not hear would create a reasonable doubt is assessed from the
perspective of a reasonable juror. See State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, ___, 342 P.3d 628,
631-32 (2015). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, because a reasonable juror could
have believed the erroneously-omitted evidence, there was a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant’s guilt, which meant the omission of that evidence was not harmless.

Id. The

Supreme Court reached that conclusion despite the fact that the Court of Appeals opinion from
which it had granted review, and to which it gave serious consideration, had found the error to be
harmless based on the Court of Appeals’ perception that the other evidence weighed strong in the
State’s favor. Compare id. with State v. Thomas, 2014 WL 1266316 (Ct. App. 2014). Similarly
here, a reasonable juror could believe the new evidence which indicated the intercourse was
consensual rather than the other evidence the State presented and acquit Mr. Ward on that basis.
For example, the district court stressed the fact that the admissions Mr. Ward made when
he entered the unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary guilty plea had been admitted during
the first trial. (R., p.184.) However, a reasonable juror could still believe the new evidence over
Mr. Ward’s prior admissions, especially since (as unrecognized by the district court), those

3

In fact, as the district court was evaluating this claim while deciding whether to dismiss a
petition for post-conviction relief, it should not have been weighing the evidence or making
credibility determinations in the first place. Workman, 144 Idaho at 323; Jones, 125 Idaho at
301.
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admissions and the resulting plea were withdrawn because the plea was not knowing, intelligent,
or voluntary. Since a reasonable juror still could believe the new evidence, there is a reasonable
doubt as to guilt. See Thomas, 342 P.3d at 631-32. Thus, as in Ellington I, the new evidence
probably would produce an acquittal. Accordingly, Mr. Ward’s new evidence satisfies the third
prong of the Drapeau standard.

4.

The failure to learn of this evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on
Mr. Ward’s part

The only part of Mr. Ward’s evidence which the district court found to not pass the fourth
prong of the Drapeau test was Mr. Buddenhagen’s affidavit. (See R., p.185.) Moreover, it
specifically contrasted Mr. Jack’s affidavit in that regard. (Tr., p.14, L.21 - p.15, L.1 (“I’ve seen
no evidence to suggest that he couldn’t with due diligence determine that. He knew about
Mr. Buddenhagen. They talked multiple times. He had known him for a long period of time.
He never found -- allegedly never found that out. Mr. Jack is a different story. . . .”); see also
R., p.102 (Mr. Jack asserting he only met Mr. Ward while they were in prison (i.e., after
Mr. Ward’s trial)).) As such, the record actually reveals the failure to identify Mr. Jack was not
due to a lack of diligence on Mr. Ward’s part. Thus, regardless of whether Mr. Buddenhagen’s
affidavit survives the fourth prong of Drapeau, Mr. Ward presented evidence which does satisfy
all four prongs of that test, which means the district court’s decision to summarily dismiss his
claim for a new trial was erroneous.
The same is true regarding the affidavits of Mr. Petersen and Ms. Wicklund. There is no
indication in the record that Mr. Ward’s failure to identify either as a potential witness was due
to a lack of diligence on his part.
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Furthermore, the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Buddenhagen’s affidavit does not
survive the fourth prong of Drapeau is actually inconsistent with the applicable legal standards.
Specifically, the district court concluded that, because Mr. Ward had told his trial attorney that
Mr. Buddenhagen was a potential witness to other facts, a diligent attorney would have
uncovered this information had he interviewed Mr. Buddenhagen. (R., p.185.) However, the
claim of ineffective assistance regarding trial counsel’s failure to sufficiently investigate
Mr. Buddenhagen was specifically raised and rejected in Mr. Ward’s initial petition for postconviction relief. Ward II, 2017 WL 1046674, **2-3 (explaining that the district court had
summarily dismissed that claim and that Mr. Ward had not pursued it further on appeal). Thus, it
is law of the case that trial counsel conducted a sufficient investigation. Swanson v. Swanson,
134 Idaho 512, 516 (2000) (explaining the doctrine of “law of the case” is designed to prevent
re-litigation of decided issues, and so, when the trial court makes a decision on an issue and that
issue is not addressed in an ensuing appeal, the trial court’s findings become “the law of the
case” and the appellate court in a subsequent appeal must defer to them). As a result, the record
in this case actually affirmatively shows that due diligence would not have uncovered the
information in Mr. Buddenhagen’s current affidavit because a sufficient (i.e., a diligent)
investigation did not, in fact, uncover that information.4
Besides, as the record indicates, Mr. Ward did not know that M.M. had been making such
statements, to Mr. Buddenhagen or others, prior to trial, and so, could not suggest his attorney
investigate for such facts. (See, e.g., R., pp.83, 102 (asserting that Mr. Ward did not learn that
Mr. Jack or Mr. Buddenhagen could testify to such facts until he was already in prison).) As the

4

The same analysis also reinforces the conclusion that the other three affidavits satisfied the
fourth prong of the Drapeau test.
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Idaho Supreme Court has acknowledged, the ABA standards for reasonable representation by
defense attorneys recognize that a reasonable attorney’s investigation “will necessarily be shaped
by a defendant’s disclosure to his counsel,” and therefore, trial counsel will not be held to be
ineffective when he does not pursue a line of investigation to which his client has made no
mention. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 280 (1998); see also Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,
435 (1986) (finding no unreasonableness in successor counsel’s failure to interview a witness,
though such an interview could have produced additional useful information, because there was
no indication in the information successor counsel had which would indicate the other
potentially-useful information existed).5
As one Idaho Supreme Court Justice aptly put it, “[o]rdinary or reasonable diligence
certainly contains some notion that defense counsel must have some reason to go looking for the
evidence in the exercise of diligence.” State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 154 (2008) (Trout, J. pro
tem, dissenting) (concluding that, because defense counsel had no information which would have
suggested the evidence at issue existed, that newly-discovered evidence should have satisfied the
fourth prong of Drapeau, lest the fourth prong of that test lose all practical meaning). Therefore,
even though Mr. Ward knew Mr. Buddenhagen could testify to one set of facts, he had no reason
to suspect that Mr. Buddenhagen could testify to an unrelated set of facts, and thus, his failure to
discover that second set of facts was not the result of a lack of due diligence on his part. That
means even Mr. Buddenhagen’s affidavit satisfied the fourth prong of Drapeau.
Ultimately, though, dsince Mr. Ward presented at least some admissible evidence which
satisfied all four prongs of the Drapeau test, this Court should reverse the district court’s

5

Trial counsel in this case was, like the attorney in Estes, successor counsel, as he took over
after initial counsel gave Mr. Ward erroneous advice about the guilty plea. See Ward I, 2014
WL 3555769, *1.
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decision to summarily dismiss his claim for a new trial based on that new evidence because that
decision was contrary to the applicable legal standards, and therefore, constituted an abuse of the
district court’s discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ward respectfully requests this Court reverse the order summarily dismissing his
claim for a new trial based on new evidence and remand this case for appropriate further
proceedings.
DATED this 23rd day of October, 2018.
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